Democratization as a Peacekeeping Strategy: A Comparative Analysis of the United States and the European Union by Orphali, Gabrielle
University of Central Florida 
STARS 
Honors Undergraduate Theses UCF Theses and Dissertations 
2021 
Democratization as a Peacekeeping Strategy: A Comparative 
Analysis of the United States and the European Union 
Gabrielle Orphali 
University of Central Florida 
 Part of the Comparative Politics Commons 
Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses 
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu 
This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the UCF Theses and Dissertations at STARS. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Honors Undergraduate Theses by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more 
information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu. 
Recommended Citation 
Orphali, Gabrielle, "Democratization as a Peacekeeping Strategy: A Comparative Analysis of the United 




DEMOCRATIZATION AS A PEACEKEEPING STRATEGY: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF  












GABRIELLE GILBERTE ORPHALI  





























The purpose of this study is to determine whether democratization should be utilized as a method 
of peacekeeping. This is determined by studying both the United States and the European 
Union’s efforts to spread democracy globally. The historic framework is studied to understand 
the unique perspective each body has formed in defining democracy, and the method through 
which it should be spread. The definition of power, democracy, and the state are studied. The 
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      The history of democracy is one that has borne witness to its inherent 
inconsistencies: in a purely theoretical state, it has been the source of profound promise to 
alleviate the ills plaguing a political society; in reality though, democracies were more apt to 
have turbulent and brief lives. It is a wonder then that this ideology found such a prominent 
position within the framework of the foreign policy agendas of two of the most influential global 
players: the United States and the European Union. 
 The rise of the popularity of this political ideology can be found in the years following 
the end of World War II. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Berlin Wall, 
anticipation that the twentieth century would usher in a democratic peace emanated. This 
promise fueled a new wave of policymaking, and it arose at a time in which the conditions to 
firmly establish democratic foundations were seemingly ideal. The post 1989 world saw an 
erosion of the tension between the capitalist West and the communist East, and the instability 
caused by the previous two wars of the century had created fertile grounds for the transition to a 
less autocratic regime. The world was ready for a transformation to take place, and the European 
Union and the United States recognized that a passive approach to democracy building could not 
be afforded at a time of such opportune change. They welcomed this shared mission, and the 
Transatlantic Agenda1 was adopted by the European Community, which predated the European 
 
1 Formalized the relationship between the European Community and the United States. Cooperation 
focused on areas such as the economy, education, science and culture.  
Union, and the United States, which sought to “support the rule of law, and democracy” 
(Warlouzet, 2019, p. 18). This established the foundation for the New Transatlantic Agenda2, 
which further promoted this goal while further seeking to “seize the opportunity presented by 
Europe's historic transformation to consolidate democracy and free-market economies 
throughout the continent” (EU).  This determination has remained even as the promise of a new 
peaceful world order has waned. Despite intermittent turmoil and disagreements, such as the war 
in Iraq, the consensus held that the promotion of democratic ideologies remained paramount 
goals of both powers. 
Purpose 
     The challenge on a global scale thus persists of how to balance the idealism of democracy 
with the realities of its failings. It is the purpose of this paper then to analyze the implementation 
of democratization as a tool for the promotion of peace in foreign policy. The importance of this 
study is apparent first in the magnitude in which democracy is intertwined with the foundations 
of both powers. The prominence of the United States has historically been derived from the 
authority obtained through the ideals of the democratic process. In regard to the European Union, 
the principle of democratization is engrained within the framework of the institution by the 
Treaty of Maastricht in 1991, and in the later revisions of 1997 and 2001. Efforts to implement 
democratic systems within these countries served as the motivation behind expansion in the East, 
and in the creation of regional policies as underscored by the European Neighborhood Policy. 
      Thus, in exploring this subject, it creates the opportunity to meet the present 
concerns surrounding the policy, as well as to explore questions such as to if: democracy 
 
2 Partnership between the United States and the European Union that outlined shared goals such as (i) 
promoting peace and stability, (ii) responding to global challenges, (iii) and contributing to the expansion 
of world trade and closer economic relations.  
promotion offer a substantial benefit to peace promotion in foreign affairs; and to what extent 






As a thorough analysis will be given using the phrases “democracy” “power” and “state,” it is 
fundamental that a comprehensive and clear definition be given to each subject. In this way, the 
clarity of the argument will not be reduced by inconsistent assumptions. 
Democracy: 
      In its most basic sense, democracy is understood to be a system in which the 
people rule. It has been the etymological understanding since its origin in ancient Greece, yet in 
the modern era the term can be quite misleading. For example, before the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall, Eastern Germany was technically a democracy. It even had a constitution which 
guaranteed similar principles entombed in that of the United States’, including equality under the 
law, freedom to assemble, and free speech. However, it was a regime ruled by corruption and 
despotism, something quite unlike what the EU and US envision. It is thus necessary to give 
some clarification as to the characters of a true democratic regime. 
     This can first be addressed by appealing to the theories of Jean Grugel, who argues that 
the meaning can be derived in the space that exists between minimalist and nominal 
interpretations. In light of the first stance, democracy can be seen as a “procedures and 
institutions, a set of rules, [in order to] process conflict” (Kaldor and Vejvoda, 1997, p. 67) It is 
these rules that allow the conflicting interests of social agents to not interfere with the harmony 
of these parties. In light of the second stance however, this ideology is a way of monitoring 
power dynamics between individuals in order to maximize their opportunities and influence 
within the societies that they live in. In this context, democracy and citizenship are inherently 
bonded together, where one informs on the identity of the other. The arrangement with the 
highest efficiency is one in which all participants of the collective essentially maintain equally 
the right to make decisions directly, an arrangement that recognizes the “greatest conceivable 
degree [of the] the principles of popular control and equality in its exercise” (Beetham, 199, p. 
130). 
     Here it is significant to note the distinction between the two interpretations is tied more to 
the nuance of the language rather than specific content. In terms of the minimalist interpretation, 
the concern lies with the process in which conflict is institutionalized, while the nominal 
approach is focused on the principles underlying democracy, such as governing with popular 
consent and accountability. This distinction is important when taking into account the two 
methods that can be utilized to expand on the definition of democracy: evaluating it through an 
empirical approach. 
An originator of the empirical approach is Robert Dahl, who focused his study of 
democracy on the institutions that guided its function. He introduced the idea of the polyarchy as 
a description of such governance, which is characterized as an arrangement where the social 
interests of competing and differing parties are guaranteed representation. The foundation of this 
system is a concurrence on an established standard of rules, the scope of policy, and the confines 
of political activity. From here are the fundamental institutions such as inclusive suffrage, access 
to fair elections of government officials, and the right to run for public office. For Dahl, these 
mechanisms allow for the natural corruptibility of humanity to be tamed. As he highlighted, 
“Human desires are insatiable, but reason dictates prudence. With the aid of reason, 
people can discover the general rules or precepts that will enable them to improve their 
chances of gaining the ends their passions dictate. All people, then, seek power in order 
to satisfy their passions. But reasons tell them how to seek power to reduce frustration, 
defeat, and the chances of violent death.” (1984, p. 51). 
Joseph Schumpeter adopts a similar stance in regard to democracy as Dahl does, yet his 
views are more pessimistic. While Dahl saw the idealized promise of democracy to establish 
rationality, Schumpeter instead saw it as a necessary check on the inadequacy of man to rule. Far 
from the glorified personification of classical antiquity, which “attributed to the electorate an 
altogether unrealistic degree of initiative…,” democracy is only a means through which 
individuals have the opportunity to refuse or accept the people that rule them. When dealing with 
the complexities of statecraft, people are generally unfit to rule, and as such democracy provides 
the mechanism to coordinate competition for leadership. Thus, it is imperative to have a system 
in which the arrangements that allow for competition between the elite decision makers are 
safeguarded, and which promotes a culture of compromise and tolerance (Schumpeter, 1975, p. 
271). 
         An ideological perspective parallels the views expressed by the empirical persuasion, yet 
it differs fundamentally in one regard. Not only is it a system in which the competing interests of 
powerful elites are reconciled, it is the only feasible government system and can be applied 
universally. Political scientist Francis Fukuyama draws on the events of the Cold War and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union to expound on this theory, stating that “humanity had reached not 
just ... the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that 
is, the endpoint of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal 
democracy as the final form of human government” (1989, p. 4). Drawing on the ideologies of 
Karl Marx and Georg Wilhelm, he proposed that all of human history was a linear progression 
which eventually culminated in the enactment of an ideal political order. Communism was 
democracy’s greatest rival, and with the exhaustion of systematic alternatives came the 
realization that it was the only viable conclusion to history's struggles. 
         This argument was further favored by the proponents of democratic peace theory, which 
argues that democracies are less likely to engage in armed conflict with each other (Mello, 
2014). This is in part because elected officials are held accountable to a large electorate under the 
institutions of this political system, and as such combat is an unappealing option for citizens and 
the government. This view does not rely on the assumption that the elected officials and civilians 
are liberal-minded, but rather that the democratic structure will ensure that citizens have enough 
leverage over the authority of the government to ensure those in power will be less likely to 
approve a war. The institutions such as competitive elections and freedom of speech thus serve to 
provide incentive for incumbent leaders to abstain from bloodshed. This theory faces some 
criticism from those who cite that it conflates causation with correlation, yet further studies by J. 
David Singer, Melvin Small, and Michael W. Doyle points to that some form of democratic 
peace can be found in these societies despite marginal exceptions (Simpson, 2019). 
Democracy to Democratization 
         The meaning of democracy has been analyzed through empirical, ideological, and 
minimal and nominal methods. A similar process is necessary now to derive its relation to 
democratization. Much as democracy was difficult to concisely define, so too was the 
complexity of the variety of literature surrounding the transformative power of democratization. 
Its most incremental formula is purely understood as the process of directing a political system to 
a government which is representative and accountable. However, despite the promise of 
democracy and the hopefulness of its proponents, why is it that some transformed democracies 
disintegrate rather than flourish? 
         One response to this is Samuel Huntington’s The Third Wave, in which he analyzes the 
process of democratization in the developing world that occurred during the same period and 
which transitioned in opposite directions. He theorizes there are three waves, the first of which 
occurred at the start of the nineteenth century and continued to the nineteen-thirties in America. 
It was closely tied with the spread of capitalism and the rise of global markets, but it quickly 
crumbled into authoritarian rule, and further challenged the growth of liberal democracy in 
communist and fascist countries. The second wave-democratization occurred largely through 
“foreign imposition and decolonization” (Huntington, 1993, p. 583). It was instigated by the end 
of the Second World War and the defeat of the axis powers, and was applied to Japan, certain 
parts of Latin America, and Western Europe. The third wave was characterized by uprisings 
which overthrew repressive dictatorships in Romania, the Philippines, and Portugal in the 1980s. 
This last instance shared common threads throughout the societies: the growth of global 
communication links, poor economic performance, the development of the European Union, and 
the preponderance of communication links globally. 
         Analyzing these trends reveals a parallel to the work of Anthony Gibbons, in which he 
argues modernity is a global trend which is capable of producing a universal culture. Modernity 
and economic progress are often associated with one another. The spread of capitalism as an 
economic system led to the rise of increased industrialization and mass consumption, supporting 
a rising middle class whose increased wealth led them to demanding greater political 
participation. This highlights the appeal of democracy as a means to transform the state in order 
to reconcile class conflict. The basic assumptions of historical sociology coincide with this 
evaluation of social cohesion, yet it delineates from modernism's interpretation of this in 
universal terms. It instead argues that the push for democratization is unique to each case and 
must be analyzed as such. The consequence of this is the promotion of the importance of agency 
in establishing this government system, wherein rational motivated actors make conscientious 
choices to construct a liberal regime. Therefore, pursuing democracy is an appealing and feasible 
initiative (Giddons, 2013). 
         Whatever the circumstances that induce aspirations for democratic transformations, it is 
an unfortunate consequence that a significant number of new democracies descend into 
militaristic authoritarian regimes. The reason for this can in part be due to the manner in which 
power is conferred in the democratization process. Suppressive regimes such as dictatorships 
often rely on a large military apparatus, which are largely integrated within the higher echelons 
of the government elite. Furthermore, their institutional role was more permanent than that of a 
specific regime: you may depose a political system and instigate a new one, but it will always 
require a military force to assure its stability. Therefore, military leaders would often initiate the 
termination of their government, often negotiating with opposition forces and civilians to codify 
their withdrawal. However, they habitually ensure their foothold in this reconstructed society by 
ensuring “exit guarantees” for their surrender. According to Demetrios Caraley: 
First, there would be no prosecution, punish- ment, or other retaliation against military 
officers for any acts they may have committed when they were in power. Second, the 
institutional roles and autonomy of the military establishment would be respected, 
including its overall responsibility for national security, its leadership of the government 
ministries concerned with security, and often its control of arms industries and other eco- 
nomic enterprises traditionally under military aegis” (2004, p. 585). 
The military would thus be capable of resuming their professional role within the new world 
order, and then recapture power when their interests arose. This transplantation through 
transformation has characterized the transitions of several systems through the three waves of 
democratization.   
         Despite the academic tradition used to analyze democracy and democratization, they each 
address a shared set of interests. First, they all acknowledge the critical role that elites have in 
affecting the manner in which transitions develop. Second, each one recognizes the role of 
institutional structures such as representative government, as well as the importance of the 
process of elections, to highlight their ability to suppress social discord. Third, each school of 
thought assimilates the approach to democracy in an international sphere. Finally, fourth, full 
comprehension of these ideologies requires an analysis of the relationship between power and 
the state, which is carried out in the latter two sections. 
Power 
Power is essentially the mechanism through which a state garners authority to exert 
influence. A prevalent theme throughout the discussion of democracy is the manner in which it is 
capable of constraining the rivalries between contending forces in order to ensure they are less 
likely to exert violence on a global level. Since conflict is a battle to garner power, a thorough 
analysis of this concept is necessary in order to understand how it meaningfully impacts the 
installation and persistence of a democratic system. 
Numerous schools of thought have been established to identify the key characteristics of 
power, especially in its relation to the perpetuation of democracy. One traditional school of 
thought is presented by Steven Lukes, wherein he argues that power is exerted in three ways: 
non-decision-making power, ideological power, and decision-making power. Decision-making 
power relates to the manner in which “power is a behavioral attribute that applies to individuals 
to the extent that they are able to modify the behavior of other individuals within a decision-
making process” (1974, p. 18). Thus, a person who has the most power in a certain situation is 
the person who succeeds in the decision-making process. As Lukes states: 
“Thus, I conclude that this first, one-dimensional, view of power involves a focus on 
behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict 
of (subjective) interests, seen as expressing policy preferences, revealed by political 
participation. (1974, p. 19)” 
This first school of thought relies on the strength of military superiority and can be only tested in 
the context in situations of physical conflict. In this more traditional conceptualization of 
interstate relations, the ability to wage warfare is the greatest indicator of status. Thus, power is 
interwoven with military strength. In this sense, the capabilities of the United States exceeds that 
of the European Union. In 2009, for example, the United States military budget was more than 
the next fourteen countries put together (Horowitz, p. 57). 
The second dimension of power extends the conceptualization of the first, encapsulating 
that individuals can exert power through forming the agenda of issues presenting to the 
population. As such, the individuals who succeed in garnering power do not exert decision 
making on existing ideologies, but levy authority over the creation of those ideologies. As 
highlighted by The Two Faces of Power, “to the extent that a person or group -- consciously or 
unconsciously -- creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts, that person 
or group has power” (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, p. 951). The use of ideologies then is a 
fundamental aspect of control. The two-dimensional theory of power repositions the importance 
of conflict to that of consent. The perception of power is one in which authority is derived from 
its connection to a common objective. As Talcott Parsons underscores power is the “general 
capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations in a system of collective 
organization… [which are] legitimized with reference to their bearing on collective goals” (1949, 
p. 171). Therefore, the statement that someone is in power really implies that someone has been 
empowered by a group.  
This capacity requires less focus on military strength, and attention devoted to influence 
and persuasion. In comparison to the United States, the European Union is a more formidable 
force. The principle of acquis communautaire highlights this, wherein European nations that 
wish to join the union must conform to the unified policies ranging from market regulation to 
education. In return, these countries are then entitled to regional funding, and garner influence 
over security and trade policies. In this manner, the European Union is able to expand its 
domination by assimilating other countries into a homogenous set of standards. 
The defining features of these two goals can be restructured into the distinctions of “soft” 
and “hard” powers. While the latter relies on capability to garner military strength, the former 
instead is instead “associated with intangible power resources, such as culture, ideology, and 
institutions” (Nye, 1990, p. 166). Soft powers also reflect Arnold Wolfer’s theory of “milieu 
goals” as a direction of diplomatic relations. Nations who pursue these goals “are out not to 
defend or increase possessions they hold to the exclusion of others,” but instead “aim instead at 
shaping conditions beyond their national boundaries” (1962, p. 73). As he highlights, were it not 
for the existence of these goals, “peace would never be the objective of national policy” as it 
requires that “peace cannot be the possession of any one nation; it takes at least two to make and 
have peace” (1962, p. 74). Diplomatic priorities have shifted in the years after the Cold War, 
away from the exertion of hard powers to the manipulation of soft powers. The proliferation of 
social media has shifted the world order in a relatively short time, providing a vehicle to disperse 
ideologies and cultural revolutions. The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 was an example of this. 
Despite this shift however, the dynamic use of hard powers should not be neglected, as “the 
protective role of military force remains a relevant asset in bargaining between states” (Nye, 
1990, pg. 160). Therefore, a three-dimensional view of power situated between the two would 
provide the best definition of power in regard to the subject of democratization. 
The third dimension is perhaps the most insidious and indirect. It involves the ability to 
convince a group to willingly act against their best interests. Thus, it is the manner in which 
individuals garner power by altering the attitudes of a subset of society so that they conform to 
the behavior the ruling class sees fit and is most commonly implemented by reinforcing a certain 
ideology or false consciousness. It is the most relevant study of power, as it takes into 
consideration all the manifestations of power, whether it be situations in which conflict is absent, 
covert, or overt.  In a departure from competing pluralistic views of his era, Luke contends that 
this is not inherently physical struggles. As he states the problem is that, 
“power, as they conceptualize it, only shows up in cases of actual conflict; it 
follows that actual conflict is necessary to power. But this is to ignore the crucial 
point that the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict 
from arising in the first place.” (1974, pg. 27) 
As Dan Little further emphasizes, “domination can occur through explicit coercive means, but it 
can also occur through unconscious mechanisms” (2010, pg. 7). This is significant in the context 
of implementation of power in a democratic nation. In this approach, power can be 
commandeered without the use of physical force. While corrupt authoritarian regimes may 
utilize this control through violent and constrictive means, the implementation of this theory 
means that democratic regimes can also assert their dominance through more harmonious 
measures. The ideal then for governing powers such as the EU and the US is to install a 
pervasive ideology which will engage a large subsect of the population to comply willingly: the 
promise of democracy offers to do just that. Furthermore, this definition recognizes the United 
States military strength, while also appreciating the ability of America to assert its own soft 
power, which may in some instances compete with that of the European Union. Therefore, this 
framework has the capacity to evaluate the nuances of power in relation to the EU and US. 
With this theoretical framework established, it is essential then to transition to an analysis 
of the definition of the state, whereby power can be synthesized. According to Gianfranco Poggi, 
to understand the modern state, one must be able to fathom the manner in which power is bound 
to economic, political and ideological resources. He derives inspiration from the writings of 
Norberto Bobio to describe economic power as that which “avails itself of the possession of 
certain goods, which are rare or held to be rare, in order to lead those not possessing them in 
carrying out a certain form of labor” (Poggi, 1990, pg. 4). Political power is inherently based in 
the ability to garner control over the means to legitimize the exertion of violence. In regards to 
ideological power, it is derived from the ability of certain individuals who maintain authority are 
able to exert influence on the attitude of the population through the dispersion of certain ideas. 
Poggi argues that these factors all exist collectively together, constraining the authority of each. 
In order for ideological and economic power to be achieved however, it requires an environment 
which is relatively stable. It is this condition then that makes it necessary for the discussion of 
the concept of “the state” in relation to its connection to “democracy” and “power.” Without the 
permanence of the state, the only type of power that would arise would be that of physical 
violence, which according to Peter Berger is “the ultimate and oldest means of social control” 
(Poggi, 1990, pg. 5). Therefore, peacekeeping initiatives are more successfully be exerted in 
contexts in which this mechanism does not exist. 
                                                         The State 
         The institutional features of the role of the state have long been unfortunately neglected 
by contemporary political and sociological theory. Progress for evaluating its theoretical 
importance was made in 1918, when German sociologist Max Weber introduced the 
conceptualization of the state as a “human community” which was able to “claim the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of physical violence within a given territory” (1946, pg. 76).  Emphasis here 
is placed on the term legitimate, as while other actors may use violence, the state is the only 
force that can lay claim to justifiably appropriating its use. This concept is inexplicably tied to 
the development of the modern state. Under feudalism for example, no lords could lay claim to 
this, as while their vassals had sworn to protect them, in truth they remained free to exert force 
within their fiefdoms. The king was not excluded from this, and both he and the landed nobility 
were forced to share their power with the authority of the Catholic church. Thus by 
“expropriating the means of political organization and domination, including violence” the 
modern state was able to establish the legitimacy of its rule (Munro, 2013, pg. 1). 
         The Weberian definition of the state conforms with the functioning of the European 
Union, which utilizes the action of “state-building” in order to attract other countries to conform 
to its ideals. Weber interprets that it was this dynamic process which gave rise to the political 
domination and constitutional development that was necessary for a modern state. For Weber 
“the history of politics is…basically this: on one hand, the institutionalization of the powers of 
command… and on the other, the emergence of power blocs [which] transform their socially pre-
eminent position into political prerogatives” (Dusra, 1918, pg. 82). Thus, the allure of the state 
authority is utilized to promote compliance to a prescribed set of approved behavior. Though the 
mechanisms to urge such acquiescence differ, the congruency between the two reveals that the 
manner the European Union operates is compatible with Weber’s definition of the state. 
         Compliance is an essential component of Weber’s discussion, as a defining feature of the 
modern state is its ability to maintain both internal and external sovereignty. While it retains 
significant control over coercive power, the state would be incapable of sustaining consistent 
internal sovereignty through ceaseless violence. As Michael Mann highlights: 
         “It is…true of the Superpowers [that]: they can impose 'friendly' regimes 
and de-stabilize the unfriendly through client military elites and their own covert 
paramilitary organizations, but they cannot get those regimes to conform closely 
to their political dictates” (1984, pg. 200). 
         Thus, while a superpower may have the military feasibility to excise a regime, physical 
force is not sufficient to establish long-term stability. An example of this is the Falklands War in 
1982, where Great Britain successfully delegitimized the Argentine regime. Though Britain 
retained the ability to replicate the punishment, it failed to establish a political future for the 
Islands, and relations between the two countries were not restored until 1989. This diplomatic 
miscalculation underscores that power cannot be forcefully taken; it must be “freely conferred by 
[civil society] upon their states” (Mann, 1984, pg. 203). Thus, a state must rely on the retention 
of legitimacy, which Weber designated in to one of three types: traditional, charismatic, and 
rational-legal. Modern rule is distinguished from its predecessors by its utilization of rational-
legal legitimacy, which is the right-to rule derived from leaders who are chosen through an 
established set of laws. Societies in which leaders derive their power through electoral processes 
are a primary illustration of this. Thus, this characterization of the state is not only compatible 
with the implementation of democracy, but greatly favors its adoption. A democracy in any form 
would possess these necessary components, establishing a written set of rules and a system 
through which members of the polity could be elected into trusted positions of influence. 
         In discussing the influence wielded by those chosen to lead, attention must be once again 
drawn to the concept of political power. On the assumption that at its most rudimentary form it is 
physical violence, what does that entail once it is intertwined with the institutions of 
government? Heinrich Popitz theorized that it initially shifts to become “depersonalized” as it 
progressively connects with positions and determined functions which surpass mere individuals. 
Next it is “formalized” as its enactment is undergone through the guidance of procedures and 
rules. In the last stage, it is “integrated” into a broader system of order. These processes, he 
argues, “stabilize and reify the power relations, creating norms and standards to steer people’s 
conduct” (Popitz, 2017, p. 173). The realization of this norm-making power prompts dominance, 
exemplified by the network of state domination. These networks serve a unitary purpose then on 
behalf of a single entity, rather than independent power centers. 
         A thorough analysis of the state cannot be complete, however, without a discussion of the 
core connection between the state and the subjects under its control: its territory. As Gianfroggo 
Poggi highlights, the connection a territory bears to its state is composed of both hard and soft 
aspects. Physical boundaries are militarily defensible and geographically distinct, but they also 
encompass a shared identity based on historic and cultural influences. This national identity 
establishes a shared set of understandings and assumptions which governs the interaction among 
citizens. Thus, if a society is going to concede to the authority of a central power, it must be one 
that is conducive to these standards. 
Accountability to its citizens thus is a precondition to state power, which in a 
contemporary world would be satisfied by the legitimacy derived from democratic principles. A 
state is able to justify its existence through the benefit it provides to its citizens, and their 
acquiescence is an affirmation of this role. According to Mann, it is this that is the very nexus of 
the prevalence of the modern state. Europe in the sixteenth century was capable of employing 
despotic power to execute administrative and security functions with no accountability to the 
citizens, but its “success was limited and precarious” (1984, p. 210). These states tended to lose 
control because they lacked the logistical capabilities to coordinate social life, which led to civil 
society becoming de-territorialized and decentralized. However, as the modern state relies on 
power derived through the people not over them, the state infrastructures serve to coordinate 
social life. This prompts the state to form close relationships with its citizens. 
The previous discussion outlined how an ideal state serves as a unifying force, yet this is 
not always the standard. Analyzing various examples of systems reveals that in certain 
circumstances, the state can in fact be a corrosive element. According to Ahmed Samatar, the 
state in its most stable form is the integral state, wherein it accomplishes the goal of sustaining a 
moral bond with its people while delivering on public goods. A developmental state is one in 
which the regime implements autonomous power to mobilize the industrial sector by investing 
the majority of a country’s capital, but in turn sacrificing public debate and civil liberties. The 
private sector is typically rigidly restricted by a group of bureaucratic government elites who are 
not elected officials, and thereby do not answer to the people. The next degeneration is the 
prebendal, in which government officials believe they have a state-derived right over capital and 
utilize the revenue to benefit their supporters and members of their ethnic group. Samatar 
highlights the misfortune of this, as the “opportunistic methods by which groups and individuals 
have marshalled support to gain or retain access to public resources [will] finally destroy the 
very institution that laid the golden egg” (1992, p. 640). When this system eventually fails to 
function comprehensively, a predator state emerges in which the regime fails to provide goods 
that promote the welfare of its citizens and social bonds decay as a result. In its most deteriorated 
form, the state becomes cadaverous, in which civic life is non-existent and political life is 
characterized by brutal physical violence.   
These trends occur even if a country has the resource wealth to ensure economic 
sufficiency for all its citizens. Thus, it is important to recognize that despite the conditions that 
shape its existence, the state is fundamentally a human invention, directly informed by the 
deliberate choices of rational actors. Furthermore, the elements of a successful modern state 
established above, such as democratic legitimacy, centrality, and autonomy, are under constant 
threats from a shifting world order. The purpose of state building should be to create “a future 
where the security and the dignity of every citizen is the principal tenet of the law of the land” 
(Samatar, 1992, p. 640). This ideal though is rarely born out of pure chance, and often requires 
efforts to suppress natural human inclinations towards greed and corruption. 
The Network State 
The most direct pressure to the elements of an idealized modern state is globalization. 
According to Manuel Castells, “globalization and liberalization do not eliminate the nation-state, 
but they fundamentally redefine its role and effects of its operation” (2000, p. 244). A clear 
definition has often eluded consensus among scholars, as significant ideology has surrounded the 
notion. However, in order to highlight how it is affecting the nature of the state, a few features 
can be identified.Its origins are better understood through the lens of an economic dimension. 
This trend only became feasible in the last twenty years, when breakthroughs in computer 
science and engineering produced the technological infrastructure to enable economies to rely 
principally on information processing. Global powers such as India, Russia, Japan, China, the 
United States, and Western Europe had the highest concentration of innovative research centers, 
placing them at the highest tier of technology and science in this coming age. The result was that 
the power to dictate and shape further development was concentrated within their spheres. 
However, while these innovations have global ramifications, the preponderance of jobs are local 
and regional. Whether individuals are able to benefit from it is dependent on their direct 
connection to the globalized sector through their national economy.   
If this globalization continues to spread throughout the world, so that all territories and all 
people are influenced by its existence, then there will be people who are not incorporated by it. 
The information age has had incredible benefits for humanity, but it also serves to disenfranchise 
a large subset. “It is this simultaneous capacity to include and exclude people, territories and 
activities that characterizes the new global economy as constituted in the information age” 
(Castells, 2000, p. 114). A similar process of disenfranchisement applies to other important 
critical aspects of social culture, including science, the media, and access to information. This 
polarization degrades the relationship between the social classes, perpetuating a system of 
exclusion and inequality. The legitimacy of a regime is thereby threatened, as it is ability to 
maintain the welfare benefits of its citizens and social cohesion is corroded. 
The state needs to redefine its role in such a system, and thus an organizational 
transformation is needed to accompany this technological transformation. A state alone cannot 
sway the direction of global flows in financial markets, and these trends are not always dictated 
to by established economic rules. Thus states have adapted to this by adopting a set of 
interconnected units known as a network. In exchange for durability, some powers have 
relinquished some authority and united in a system in which sovereignty is shared in the pursuit 
of global governance. These systems have always existed, but in the shifting nature of this 
technological age, they have become the most influential form of organization. This is because 
the “strength of networks is their flexibility, their decentralizing capacity, their variable 
geometry, adapting to new tasks and demands without destroying their basic organizational rules 
or changing their overarching goals'' (Dagron, 2006, p. 954). The rise of the network state meant 
that where once prerogatives such as defense, migration, or management of an economic policy 
were unique to a country, they would now be exercised jointly through a chain of institutions. 
The European Union is perhaps the greatest realization of this goal. It comprises twenty-
seven member states whose policies are highly integrated. In regard to migration, all member 
states are able to avail themselves to open flow of movement within its borders. The judicial 
system is also unified, as any decision made by the European Court of Justice and European 
Court of Human Rights are mandatory for all members. In terms of economic policies, the 
Maastricht treaty established a common currency to be used among the members. Furthermore, 
the European Commission has the power to act on the behalf of any of the states in regard to 
trade disputes where third parties are involved. There are aspects in which the Union is not 
always unilaterally united. The recent dissonance over the favorability of the military action by 
the United States government in Iraq is an example of this. However, the ability for such large 
and distinctive powers to unite together within a stable and mutually beneficial relationship is an 
admirable accomplishment. 
In this shifting order, the promise of democratization as an initiative of the European 
Union becomes more compelling. Regimes in which the government suppresses the population 
and consolidates the majority of the wealth are unlikely to be able to adapt to this economic 
reorganization. If they do, it is likely that the manner in which they do so will benefit a small 
share of elites while debilitating the majority of the citizenry. The European Union has an 
established framework of shared initiatives and codified rules which all members must conform 
to if they wish to benefit from the network. Thus, these recovering states could share in the 
promise of globalization while also obtaining the government mechanisms necessary to disperse 
the revenue throughout their society. The result would be a more consolidated world order, in 
which countries united in the promotion of each member.   
                                                         Conclusion 
         I began this section by analyzing the fundamental concepts in relation to democratization, 
so that an understanding of the crucial constitutive meanings integral to the enactment of these 
strategic doctrines could be established. I therefore investigated the concepts of democracy, 
power, and the state through various academic schools of thought to discern the nature of these 
notions. 
         In my discussion of democracy, I analyzed interpretations that were empirical and 
idealistic, and nominal and minimalist. These all highlighted the ability of democratic institutions 
to harmonize the consistent competition between social groups, while others argued that it was 
the only feasible form of government. In regard to democratic transition, recognition is paid to its 
association with modernity and the role of the military elite is provided as an explanation as to 
why these transitions sometimes fail. 
         Power is addressed by evaluating both its covert and overt manifestations, and discussing 
the effects of authority, coercion, and influence. An essential aspect is the focus on situations in 
which citizens consent to relinquish their power to centers to their government officials, so that 
coercive powers are not relied on as a primary method of domination. Lastly, attention is given 
to classifying the central features of the modern state, essentially centrality, organization, and 
autonomy, and then the manner in which this traditional definition is affected by globalization is 
highlighted. These serve to inform on the preceding discussion on the role of the European 















American and European Perspectives 
         In the previous section a significant effort was dedicated to analyzing the relevant 
theories. The goal of the proceeding section is to transition to evaluating the empirics. This will 
be accomplished first through analyzing how European and American thinkers have adapted 
their own conceptualization of democracy, power, and the state. In regard to the United States, 
this evaluation will be focused primarily on the concept of Neoconservatism, which has striking 
relevance in this arena as it is credited as informing deeply the foreign policy of the Bush 
administration. It is important to note here that Neoconservatism is only one theory of many that 
has informed on the foreign policy agenda of the United States. It is studied here because of its 
popularity during the Bush administration. In regard to the European Union, I will utilize the 
normative power Europe framework, which characterized the EU’s role in its global role. In 
doing so, I will analyze how the independent documents identify how democratization can 
promote these ideals and how each power determines significant threats to international security 
and peace. This will establish the standards to approach an analysis of the case studies discussed 
later. 
Neoconservatism 
         Neoconservatism has experienced a recent wave of criticism, due mainly to the belief that 
the Bush administration relied too heavily on its tenets. Though many academics have informed 
on its incarnation, Irving Kristol is largely regarded as the founder of the movement, born from 
his disenchantment with the promise of Marxism and the ineptitude of Joseph Stalin’s regime. 
Surprisingly, Kristol dismisses the idea of Neoconservatism and a movement, favoring instead to 
perceive it as an inclination, which “manifests itself over time… and whose meaning we only 
clearly glance at in retrospect” (Kristol, 1995, p. 23). Neoconservatism is thus an organized set 
of attitudes which find their origin in historical experiences. 
         A great focus of Kristol’s work is the manner in which a country’s behavior in relation to 
foreign authorities is informed by its power. For a player like the United States, its power means 
that the scope of its influence transcends national boundaries. The perception of national interests 
is broad in scope, as it is deeply influenced by the ideological foundation of the country, which is 
based on democratic ideals. Such perception provides justification as to why the United States 
chose to partner with Great Britain and France during World War II, as well as to why it also has 
perpetuated further interventionist policies in foreign nations. As Kristol highlights this principle 
by stating “power breeds responsibilities, in international affairs as in domestic -- or even 
private. To dodge or disclaim these responsibilities is one form of the abuse of power” (1995, p. 
157). The feasibility of such endeavors is derived from the United States prevalence of hard 
powers, as discussed previously in regard to Nye’s work. The military strength of the United 
States is superior to other nations, a situation which arose as a consequence of the end of the 
Cold War. 
Europe was focused on promoting social policy, and thus redirected funds from its 
military. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a power vacuum was created in the global 
field in which the United States arose as a singular authority. According to Kristol, this power 
requires that the United State embrace its responsibility as a protectorate of democratic ideals. 
This argument has defined the attitudes of the Neoconservative movement following the 
cessation of the Cold War. This is highlighted within the works of Charles Krauthammer, who 
proposed in his work The Lonely Superpower that the esteemed position the United States 
experiences demands that it maintains world peace, with the primary motive of propagating the 
adoption of democratic systems of government. As he argues, 
“that the end of American foreign policy is not just the security of the United States, but 
what John F. Kennedy called ‘the success of liberty.’ That means, first, defending the 
community of democratic nations (the repository of the liberal idea) and second, 
encouraging the establishment of new liberal policies at the frontier, most especially in 
the Third World” (1986).  
Krauthammer negated the prevailing theory of his contemporaries who argued that the fall of the 
Soviet Union would enact a global order in which the threat of warfare would be diminished, and 
the world would become multipolar. These invalid views echo Fukuyama’s argument that a 
harmonious democratic system would unilaterally arise with the cessation of the Cold War, yet 
they fail to acknowledge the shifting geopolitical structure of the era. In his work the Unipolar 
Moment, he instead predicted that the United States would emerge as the hegemonic power over 
the world whose strength would far exceed that of any other global player. Peace would not be 
assured in this system as, 
“International stability is never a given. It is never the norm. When achieved, it is the 
product of self-conscious action by the great powers, and most particularly of the greatest 
power, which now and for the foreseeable future is the United States. If America wants 
stability, it will have to create it” (1990, p. 23).  
Undeniably, the United States did benefit from a military and economic superiority, 
which enabled it to exert significant influence over instances of global conflict. This was 
highlighted during the first war against in Iraq against Saddam Hussein, in which Krauthammer 
argues that “the United Nations [could] guarantee nothing… were it not for United States leading 
and prodding…nothing would have been done: no threat of force, no embargo, no Desert Storm” 
(2004, p. 18).Multilateralism in this sense was illusionary only, ineffective and worse, a threat to 
the U. S’s free exercise of power. 
         The attention given to this armed conflict underscores an element which Krauthammer 
believed distinguished the new world order. Rather than seeing the proliferation of harmonious 
and secure societies, the era instead became more susceptible to discord. This is a consequence 
of the rise of globalization, which despite the positive innovations derived from technological 
innovation, has also produced threatening repercussions. One of the most dangerous of these is 
the spread of nuclear weapons. During the Cold War it would have been implausible for a state 
without a large industrial sector to obtain the means to threaten the security of its neighbors, yet 
within the new era backward and peripheral Middle Eastern states arose swiftly to pose sincere 
threats to world security. “The divide between great powers and regional powers is radically 
narrowed…missiles shrink distance [and] nuclear devices multiply power” (Youhana). If these 
small autocratic regimes were capable of accumulating significant armaments, then they would 
attain an unacceptable equity with the authority of the United States. These threats were 
designated as “Weapon States,” in which he identified as consisting of shared characteristics; a 
deep grievance against Western imperialism, which serves to motivate its military expansion; a 
government apparatus that subverts and dominates the will of the people; and indefinite borders 
implemented by previous colonial rulers. The necessity of suppressing such threats became a 
primary concern in Krauthammer’s foreign policy initiatives. 
         The opposition to such forces expanded past the theories of Krauthammer however, and 
was adopted by American policymakers by the 1990s, arriving at the end of the First Gulf War. 
In his essay “Confronting Backlash States”, advisor Anthony Lake highlighted that Bill Clinton’s 
national security priorities targeted several “outlaw states” including North Korea, Cuba, Iraq, 
Iran and Libya, which would “assault [democracy’s] basic values” (2009). “For the sake of both 
its interests and its ideals” argues Lake, “the United States has a special responsibility to nurture 
and promote their core values” (2009).   
         This attitude is further reflected in the foreign policy initiatives of George W. Bush. The 
terrorist attacks of 9/11, as well as the armed intervention in Afghanistan brought greater 
recognition to the threat of Weapon States. There was no longer a distinction among these unique 
actors; instead, all combatant forces were combined as a unitary threat to the prosperity of 
democracy. In his 2002 state of the Union address, President Bush promoted the fear of an “axis 
of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world,” implying a relationship that was nonexistent 
between Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. In 2003, Krauthammer reformed his theories in the 
Unipolar Moment Revisited, wherein he asserted that the conflict the United States experienced 
was confirmation of the Neoconservative theory. He believed that the U.S. would continue to be 
plagued for the foreseeable duration by the consistent threat of rogue states.  The Bush’s 
administration’s policies of regime change, and continuous strikes were thus necessary to usher 
in a new protective order. 
The Obama administration did not maintain the same overt ardor for the initiative of 
democracy building, but it similarly espoused the war on Weapon states. Deriving credence from 
the echoes of Krauthammer’s vigilance, relations with Iran during the first term were marked by 
the threat of military strikes and sanctions. While the rhetoric shied away from promoting a 
neoconservative sentiment, the initiatives taken in regard to the Middle East revealed that its 
influence was still prevalent. The preponderance of these ideals is further enumerated by the fact 
that they remained a conspicuous organizational narrative for the Trump administration. 
Discourse such as the discussion of a preemptive war with North Korea or claims instigated by 
Mike Pompeo in regard to imposing heavy sanctions against Iran, highlights that the writings of 
Krystol and Krauthammer have left a lasting imprint. 
In what manner do these arguments expound on the theoretical concepts examined in the 
previous section? First, the Neoconservative understanding of power is understood to be one 
reliant primarily on hard factors, mainly those derived and evaluated through the context of 
conflict. The ability of the state to enforce its mandates through coercive force is a guiding force 
through which legitimacy is derived. As revealed by the writing of post-Cold War intellectuals, 
the fall of the Soviet Union ushered in an era defined by the hegemonic authority of the United 
States which required the utilization of military force to maintain a stable peace. From here, it 
can be understood that power is identified through two approaches: one that is pragmatic and 
another which is moral. Moral authority is not born from appeal to soft power such as social 
unity or economic promotion. Instead, the imperative is born from the evaluation of the 
superiority of the American military strength and the broad interpretation of the definition of 
national interest. The Neoconservative approach to analyzing power places a significant 
emphasis on the role of military might, but with the purpose of promoting democratic principles 
and confronting rogue states which threaten the harmony of the world order. 
The promotion of democracy became a major initiative after the downfall of the Soviet Regime, 
yet the ideals of such a strategy had long been a pursuit of the country’s diplomatic efforts. An 
increasing concern for the superpower however was an inherent paradox that required the United 
States to intervene on the autonomy on foreign countries in order to promote self-government. A 
significant impetus for accomplishing this task was firstly that occupying a country went against 
the very principles of democratic rule, and second, whether a democracy could be maintained 
whether the coercive threat of military strength was removed. 
These tensions could be addressed if the United States established justifiable means to 
legitimize their influence. The process of democratization must find credence in both ideological 
and strategic grounds, as highlighted by Krauthammer, “to intervene solely on the basis of 
democratic morality is to confuse foreign policy with philanthropy,” but “to act purely for the 
reasons of strategy is corrupting and unsustainable for a democracy” (Krauthammer, 1985, pg. 
10). The Cold War however ushered in a transition from these parameters, derived from the 
belief that in defending democratic principles abroad, the safety of America would by extension 
be secured. Furthermore, unilateral decision making was justified by the belief that there was no 
alternative power who had the capability to enact this initiative, and also because while the 
United States may have been immune to certain threats, smaller states were not. This required 
that the United States use its coercive power to act on their behalf. 
Similar principles are used to justify the same show of force in contemporary foreign 
policy. It is proposed that the threat posed by the spread of communism is a comparable struggle 
to that of the perpetuation of Arab-Islamic totalitarianism. The answer to this concern then takes 
the form of democratic globalism, a “foreign policy that defines national interest not as power, 
but as values” (Krauthammer, 2004, pg. 6). Here the Neoconservative interpretation combines 
two rationales previously discussed to justify democratic peace in the previous section. 
Normative justifications are based on the assumption that the ruler of a democracy will reduce 
international conflict by appealing to peaceful negotiations. Institutional rationales on the other 
hand argue that a democracy’s accountability to its political elites through the utilization of 
checks and balances is responsible, thereby constraining corruptive behavior. Through the model 
of the United States, both these actions are complementary. 
Lastly, the role of the state garners prominent discussion in reference to democratic 
globalization. The threat to democracy discussed in previous sections calls attention to a 
discussion of regime types, which is fundamental in regard to the Neoconservative perception of 
both foreign and domestic affairs. Philosopher Leo Strauss’ ideas were utilized to inform the 
importance of this. He viewed regimes in a classical sense, in which the informal habits and the 
formal institutions are capable of merging. Regimes thus constitute the manner in which to live a 
life and shapes the human behavior of its citizenry. 
Two implications can thus be derived from this analysis, the first of which is that certain 
problems related to global politics could be remedied by a transformation of the regime. The 
normative explanation of democratic peace supports this assertion, as it highlights that the 
foreign policy of a country is the reflection of its morals of the underlying society. If a country 
has a regime in which the members are treated justly, they are likely to replicate the behavior 
with foreign nations. Second, the initiatives to modify the authoritarian regime is likely to be less 
effective than transforming the nature of the system itself. 
Normative Power Europe 
 Unlike the United States, the European Union does not have cohesive guiding political 
ideology which explicitly designates democratization as a moral obligation. Indeed, since the 
onset of European integration, implicit reference to democracy promotion has often been 
concealed under the guise of broad human rights policy. Thus while it is widely accepted that the 
premise of assimilation in to the EU is derived from the basis that member states are to be 
consolidated democracies guided by the rule of law, “little reference to these allegedly 
constitutive norms can be found in the founding treaties” (Holzhacker and Neuman, 2018, p. 16). 
However, “the lack of references to these norms in the founding documents should not be 
understood as a complete absence of a focus on human rights and democratic developments in 
the early stages of European integration” but rather “as a testimony to both the scope of 
European integration and the context within which this took place (Holzhacker and Neuman, 
2018, p.17).  
 As was the case with the United States, the Cold War marked a transformative period in 
the development of the European Union as a driving external force of democratization. The two 
bodies which constitute the origins of the EU, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
and the European Economic Community (EEC), determined assimilation on a primarily 
economic basis. The rights of a citizen were established pertaining to their relation European 
market, such as a business owner or a worker (Smith, 2003). The promotion of a unifying human 
rights policy was seen as unnecessary in relation to this goal, and such efforts were instead 
entrusted to other international bodies such as the Counsel of Europe. It was not until the 
Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity in 1973 that the profile of both democracy and 
human rights was elevated to explicitly become the principles upon which a common identity 
would be established. They asserted that “determined to defend the principles of representative 
democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice – which is the ultimate goal of economic progress 
– and of respect for human rights” (European Communities 1973, p. 1). However, while the 
member states “specified which underlying values would inform its internal identity,” they did 
not create “an outward-geared human rights and/or democratization policy” (Holzhacker and 
Neuman, 2018, p. 17). Without this dimension, the member states were unable to take on an 
active role in bringing about a democratic transformation.  
 The onset of the Cold War altered the manner in which the European community viewed 
its position within world politics. After fifty-years at the epicenter of a bi-polar world order, the 
member states found themselves conferred upon by a multitude of challenges that threatened 
their position in the international system. The answer to this was the signing of the Treaty of the 
European Union in 1992, which bound its members “to common policies over issues including 
humanitarian aid and peacekeeping, in addition to other policies such as trade and cooperation 
agreements, conflict prevention and economic sanctions, to the point where it is the only genuine 
supranational power in world politics (Smith, 2005, pg. 171).” The establishment of EU 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) meant that discourse around the organization 
centered on its role as a distinct institution, rather than analyzing it on an individual state level.  
 It was in this context that Ian Manners developed the Normative Power Europe 
Framework (NPE) and profoundly impacted European integration scholarship. He argued that 
this conceptualization was based in “power over opinion… and the desire to move beyond the 
debate over state-like features through and understanding of the EU’s identity; effectively a 
series of principles and shared beliefs that the member states adhere to and set an example with” 
(Manners, 2002, p.239; Hardwick, 2011,p. 2). Manners contended that this does not undermine 
the civilian or military power which the organization possesses, but rather draws attention to the 
ideological impact that the EU exerts on a global scale. Indeed, he expanded on the ideas of 
Johan Gultung, who argued that there is a distinction between the channels of power, (punitive 
power), and and the sources of power (structural power), a differentiation which is significant as 
“it is on the latter that the European Community is particularly strong, even more so than the 
United States (Galtung, 1973, p. 36). Normative power is thus not distinguished by its reliance 
on military might, but rather on the ability to exert influence through opinions and ideas. Power 
emanates from the capacity to establish what is “normal in world politics,” which is willingly 
accepted and adopted. The idea of a normative power Europe was unique because it centered 
analysis on “cognitive processes” , both “substantive and symbolic components,” rather than 
“empirical emphasis on EU institutions or policies” (Manners, 2002, pg. 239).  
 The norms which constitute the EU’s international identity have developed throughout 
the years through a series of treaties, declarations, policies and conditions, and then cemented in 
the EU’s body of law, the acquis communitaire. The five core norms which serve a basis of the 
normative character are: “peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human 
rights. This is further supported by four minor norms: social solidarity, anti-discrimination, 
sustainable development, and good governance” (Holzhacker and Neuman, 2019, pg. 14). The 
establishment of these standards provides the basis through which the EU derives its legitimacy 
as a regulatory power. Indeed, the implications of this reconceptualization meant that:  
 “the EU as a normative power has an ontological quality to it-that the EU can be 
conceptualized as a changer of norms in the international system... that the EU acts to change 
norms in the international system; and that the EU should act to extend its norms into the 
international system” (Manners, 2002, p. 252).  
  This imperative was a function of the post-Cold War years, where social solidarity 
served as an important counter measure to the Communist threat. In the era following, member-
states reassessed their role within a global context and the idea of democracy promotion abroad 
garnered greater prominence. The organization has taken further steps to produce an external 
policy conditioned by these norms, which has aligned it more with the universal declaration of 
human rights and (UDHR) and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) than “most other actors in world politics” (Manners, 2002, p. 241).  It has 
further cemented its commitment to such actions through Article 21 of the Treaty on the 
European Union, which states: 
 “The Union's performance on the international scene shall be guided by the principles 
which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to 
improve in the wider world: democracy, the  rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the   principles of equality 
and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law 
(Treaty on European Union, 2008).”  
 In order to be a normative power, “a state must not only seek normative objectives when 
pursuing a foreign policy, but it must also achieve its goals through normative instruments such 
as economic and diplomatic means” rather than coercive measures (Tocci, 2008, pg. 8). The EU 
has thus relied on the mechanism of norm diffusion in order to disperse these standards on a 
global level. The approach taken is dependent on the country and region, and can be delineated 
into four categories: “(i) direct EU democracy policies, programs, and instruments; (ii) indirect 
support through economic development and support for good governance; (iii) a coordinating 
approach at international and regional bodies; and (iv) a multilevel governance approach with the 
member states.” (Holzhacker and Neuman, 2019, pg. 24). The first approach relies on the 
mechanisms of procedural and informational diffusion in order to support the building of 
democratic institutions and an active civil society. The second approach is indirect, and focuses 
on promoting economic development and the advancement of a liberal middle class, which in 
turn would be supportive of democratization efforts.  
 The third approach “broadens the EU’s impact by adding to its institutional strength” 
(Holzhacker and Neuman, 2019, pg. 25). These bodies include the United Nations (UN), the 
Council of Europe (CoE), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and other such regional organizations. In 
these cases, the information diffusion of norms is intensified and amplified among the countries 
with which the EU regularly interacts, and at the same time, the norms are also spread more 
widely to countries that typically have less interaction with the EU. The final dimension of the 
EU’s contemporary democratization approach is focused on the EU’s multilevel governance 
approach, the activities of individual member states abroad, the development of CFSP, and the 
creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Whether through EEAS declarations 
and statements (information diffusion), the institutionalization of relations between third 
countries and individual EU member states (procedural diffusion), the establishment of EU 
delegations and offices around the world by the EEAS (overt diffusion), or the provision of aid 
and assistance by EU member states in third countries (transference), the EU is actively making 
use of its twenty-eight member states as additional venues to promote democracy abroad 
(Holzhacker and Neuman, 2019; Manners, 2002).  
 Of all the methods utilized by the EU to spread its normative principles, none have been 
as significant as the enlargement policies. It requires that countries who wish to accede to the EU 
must meet a list of criteria, and thus falls within the purview of the first method of norm 
diffusion. Within these criteria, the EU embedded more updated ideas of good governance; while 
not explicitly stating them, the EU reflected them through the addition of positive conditionality 
and assistance aimed at achieving administrative reform. In order to become a member, 
candidates must accept the  European  laws and comply with the Copenhagen Criteria regarding  
guaranteeing democratic norms and institutional stability (Council of the EU, 1993). As a result,   
the political requirements have had a definite impact on the candidate countries as the 
fundamental liberal principle of legitimate statehood constitutes the most significant prerequisite  
to entry into the EU (Schimmelfennig, 2006, p. 213). 
 In the context of the theoretical concepts discussed above, the European Union notably 
deviates from that of the United States. First, the basis of NPE is that power is not derived from 
military force, but rather on the use of non-coercive means. Its legitimacy is not born from the 
use of physical force, but rather its role as promoter of principles. It involves persuasion, 
argumentation, and the conferral of prestige or shame as a socializing force in terms of the 
impact of the actions taken to promote such principles (Manners, 2011). As with the United 
States, a moral imperative underlies the rationale behind its actions. As underscored by the 
President of the EU commission, Jose Manuel Barrosa, the EU is “one of the most important, if 
not the most important, normative powers in the world… it is in fact the EU which sets the 
standards for others much of the time” (Bickerton, 2011, g. 28). Yet its advocacy for the 
promotion of sustainable peace and effective multilateralism is a marked departure from the 


















Case Studies  
Iraq 
As discussed in previous sections, American foreign policy has been colored by the 
determination that it carried the burden of enacting democratic ideals throughout the world. This 
moral imperative was born from the threat of the Cold War, and gave rise to democratic 
installations in both Japan and Germany. In the decades following this period, the rise of nuclear 
power meant that Middle Eastern autocracies transplanted communist nations as the greatest 
perceived threat to world security. Beginning in the 1990s, the United States refocused its 
foreign policy agenda to prioritize this region, highlighted by President George W. Bush’s 
assertion that the Middle East “must be the focus of American policy for decades to come” 
(Bush, 2003). Central to this goal was the “the establishment of a free Iraq” which would serve 
as “a watershed event in the global democratic revolution” (Bush, 2003) Prior to 9/11 however, 
the United States approach was one that could be best described as hesitant and subdued. Indeed, 
a year after the attacks, Richard Haas, publicly acknowledged that the U.S.’s policy toward the 
Middle East had been operating in default mode (Haas 2002). When necessary, sanctions and 
military strength were utilized to inhibit actions taken by the Hussein regime, and The Iraq 
Liberation Act of 1998 dedicated $95 million to democratic opposition organizations. Despite 
this however, both George Bush Senior and Bill Clinton were unabashed in admitting that the 
primary motivation was the protection of American interests in the wider Arab world.  
The 9/11 terrorist attack on the twin towers marked a significant shift in American 
foreign policy. It provided the final incentive and justification to the United States government to 
adopt a more determined stance in the Arab world. In 2003, the United States and coalition 
forces launched a formal invasion into Iraq, setting into motion a war that would last years and 
instigated significant change within the political landscape of the Middle East. 
From the beginning, efforts in democracy promotion were clearly aimed to promote 
Western Style democracy and the values that underpinned it. According to academics Jeff 
Bridous and Milja Kurki, the term “democracy assistance” was developed to describe an 
ensemble of techniques utilized by the United States to implement democracy support programs 
that included “programming, sourcing of partners, technical support of target governments and 
NGOs” (Taqi, 2015, p.24). These NGOs, based both in the United states and within the target 
country, were chosen through a sophisticated procurement system. Funding was based around 
the organization's ability to pass assessments based on progress in four pillars: elections and 
political processes, civil society, rule of law, and governance. Thus, when the administration 
spoke about “democracy support” throughout the Arab world, it had a clear understanding of the 
form it wanted it to take. Therefore the U.S. strategy could be more accurately defined as “a 
direct attempt to export political [and economic] institutions that comprise the American liberal 
democratic system” (Taqi, 2015, p. 30). This is indeed reflected within then President Bush’s 
declarations regarding the invasion of Iraq, implying that since the standardized Western version 
worked within the United States, it would be successful within the Middle East, therefore 
remedying the region’s instability. 
The Bush’s administration’s prioritization of peacebuilding through democratization was 
indicative of traditional neoconservative thinking, so much so that his foreign policy became 
synonymous with the school of thought. When speaking with the Weekly Standard in 2007, his 
Vice President Dick Cheney stated that: 
“I am a big democracy advocate. And I say that for a couple of reasons. Because on the 
one hand I think we have an obligation, we Americans, if we go in and take down a 
government to do the best we can to stand up a new one in its place that meets the 
standards and principles that we believe in.......Political reform is part of that.......”(Hayes 
2007, p.474) 
As highlighted by the teachings of Irving Kristol, the scope of America’s power meant that its 
influence transcended national boundaries. “Power breeds responsibilities” he claimed, and the 
United States military and economic strength meant “to dodge or disclaim these responsibilities 
is [an] abuse of power” (Kristol, 1995, p. 157). Furthermore, when discussing the motivation 
behind the regime transition, the Bush administration often interchanged the antithetical concepts 
of “freedom” and “democracy” with one another. In espousing these notions Bush and his 
officials utilized an understanding of power derived from a moral authority central to 
neoconservative thinking. Indeed, the fundamental distinctions between the two concepts were 
disregarded, moved aside to prescribe to a seemingly obvious perspective that where there is 
democracy, citizens of a country will be able to exercise their inalienable rights. In his memoir, 
Decision Points, Bush reiterated a statement made during his Second Inaugural Address, that 
“America’s vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one” (Bush, 2010, pg. 396). 
This idealism had the unmistakable imprint of democratic peace theory, the belief that 
“Democracies are inherently more friendly to the United States, less belligerent to their 
neighbours, and generally more inclined to peace” (Krauthammer, 2004, pg. 11). It was a theory 
that had certainly been relevant in the democratization campaigns following World War II, when 
the United States had adopted its self-appointed mantle as world-peacekeeper. Both Germany 
and Japan were able to make the transition from Axis-power to peaceful democracies through the 
explicit assistance of American military force and these transitions set a standard of post-conflict 
nation-building that has not since been matched” (cited in Dobbins et al, 2003pg.13). The 
creation of these allies played a large role in Bush’s justification for invasion, as he cited in 
Decision Points: 
“I had studied the histories of post-war Germany, Japan, and South Korea. Each had 
required many years – and a U.S. troop presence – to complete the transition from 
devastation of war to stable democracies .............With time and steadfast American 
support, I had confidence that democracy in Iraq would succeed” (Bush, 2010, pg. 357). 
The United States was faced with a similar challenge as it had been when threatened by 
decades prior, and to ignore such a call to arms would have been a betrayal to the ideals the 
country was founded on. 
         Thus when the United States and coalition forces began their invasion, two objectives 
were formally stated, the first was to find Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, and the second 
was to bring democracy to the Iraqi populace. While the former was never found, the promise of 
the latter remains unfilled. At the time of the invasion, numerous scholars expressed pessimism 
at the possibility of democracy ever coming to fruition, citing that the country lacked the proper 
prerequisites necessary for establishing a stable system. These critics argue that efforts to export 
democracy are likely to fail because “external factors” such as military intervention “are 
secondary to internal ones” (Stradioto, 2003, p. 4). These internal factors include historical, 
cultural, socio-economic, and political factors which help form the forces that are responsible for 
the development and stabilization of democratic structures. Since its formal independence in 
1932, the country has progressed from one form of dictatorship to another, “with personalization 
rather than institutionalization of politics determining the mode of change and development” (p. 
177). Any change in the regime has thus been derived as a result of violence, and as such the 
manner of which Iraq has evolved as a state has thus arisen through suppression. A number of 
factors have contributed to this situation, and their interactions have impeded efforts of liberal 
reform. 
         The first of which is the national identity and demographic profile of Iraq. According to 
Max Weber’s theory, the state serves as a “human community” through which the allure of the 
state authority is used to promote compliance to a prescribed set of approved behavior. However, 
“ethnic and sectarian divisions have frequently posed a serious threat to the country’s territorial 
integrity and its claim to nation state-statehood” (p. 177). Located mainly in the north of the 
country is a large Kurdish Sunni minority which have consistently sought autonomy through 
revolt, either in their own interests or in affiliation with their allies in Turkey and Iran. In 
addition to this, the Sunni’s comprise the majority of the ruling elite, despite the fact that Shi’ites 
compose a larger percentage of the population. The Sunni’s dominion has been aided through the 
support of other Arab nations, as the Shi’ites in Iraq are viewed as the allies of Shi’ite Iran. 
         The second factor is derived from issues associated with the implementation of the 
historical entity of Iraq. After the fall of the Abbasid dynasty in 1258, Iraq largely ceased to exist 
as an identifiable political unit. Up until World War II it was relegated as an imperial province 
by the Ottoman Empire. After the war a British mandate reshaped it into a political unit once 
again, but according to historians this was done without much consideration to the country’s 
persistent viability. Great Britain followed a pattern which it had enacted throughout the Middle 
East, and did little to encourage the development of democratic values within Iraq. The country 
was dominated by pro-British absolute monarchical rule until 1958, when an Arab nationalist 
group revolted and established an Arab republic. Iraqi politics were transformed, but this radical 
breakthrough brought various militant sections of the society into conflict, instigating decades of 
coups and bloodshed. 
         A third factor was that following the heightening of the Cold War, Iraq was surrounded 
by powerful rival countries whose cross-border affiliations predisposed them to anti-Iraqi 
sentiment. The hostilities between Iran and Iraq were historic and rooted in concerns over 
territorial boundaries and internal security. In the years preceding the Ba’ath takeover, the United 
States-backed Iran sought to undermine the regime by exploiting the tensions between the ruling 
elite and the Shi’ites, notably in the Kurdish population. Additionally, the pro-west Turkey 
increasingly began to view Iraq as the blossoming center of Arab radicalism and further sought 
to heighten discord within the Kurdish population by providing aid, in part to neutralize “their 
possible support for the Kurds in Turkey in their bid to independence” (178). Syria, Iraq’s most 
important neighbor, also had vested interest in the destabilization of the government, as the 
ideological rift between the two nations continued to grow.  
         These shifting international and national circumstances created the ideal environment for 
the small socialist Ba’ath Party, and by extension Saddam Hussein, to seize power in July 1968. 
By manipulating the volatile internal and external relations within the country, combined with 
the use of expansive violence as a means of governance, Hussein was able to establish a unique 
personal dictatorship. Although for the first ten years Sadam held the position of vice president, 
his position as the authority of the regime was explicit from the beginning. The socialist 
philosophy of the Ba’ath party was of little relevance to Hussein, who utilized this ideological 
framework to grant his personal ambitions legitimacy. His bureaucratic system siphoned 
resources from the oil-rich country to benefit the Sunni Iraqis that dominated his party, as well as 
his Taqridi clan and members of his own family. According to Samatar’s analysis of the erosion 
of the state, Iraq in this era was defined as prebendal, and as he highlights, the misfortune of this 
is that the “opportunistic methods by which groups and individuals have marshalled support to 
gain or retain access to public resources [will] finally destroy the very institution that laid the 
golden egg” (1995, p. 640). Under Saddam Hussein’s leadership, Iraq was characterized by low 
levels of civil society autonomy, rule of law, and political autonomy, all of which posed serious 
boundaries on the establishment of a democratic system. 
         Structuralist and strategic choice explanations argue that domestic conditions are primary 
in bringing about such a transformation, but the lack of these prerequisites does not necessarily 
imply that the failure of democracy is a foregone conclusion. According to Samuel Huntington’s 
The Third Wave, the process of democracy in developing worlds can be codified as following 
three steps: in the first stage an authoritarian regime must be removed, followed by the 
installation of a new regime, and finally the consolidation, or long-term sustainability of a 
democratic regime. In Iraq, where the internal prerequisites have failed to bring about regime 
change, “foreign intervention is an important causal factor contributing to the removal of an 
authoritarian regime and the installation of a democratic regime” (Stradiato, 2003, p. 4). In this 
scenario, the prospects of democratizing Iraq were directly tied to the success of the United 
State’s military in overthrowing the target regime. 
         This is where the significance of the United States power becomes essential in 
understanding the dynamics of this regime shift. As Steven Lukes discussed, in situations in 
which physical conflict are dominant, the ability to wage warfare is the greatest indicator of 
status. Power is thus interwoven with military strength, and the capabilities of the United States 
military allow it to establish “decision-making power.” These hard powers enabled the United 
States to possess the necessary authority, even if only temporarily, “to modify the behavior of 
other individuals within a decision-making process” (Lukes, 1974, p.18). Iraq had suffered a 
government which brutalized its people and was the foremost agitator of both economic and 
social problems, and thus the process of democratization was not an easy task. Yet by removing 
the former regime, the United States military had removed the greatest impediment. 
         Whatever impediments that inhibit aspirations for democratic transformations, it is an 
unfortunate circumstance that a significant number of new democracies descend into militaristic 
authoritarian rule. The reason for this can in part be due to the manner in which power is 
conferred in the democratization process. Suppressive regimes such as dictatorships often rely on 
a large military apparatus, which are largely integrated within the higher echelons of the 
government elite. When it is anticipated that a regime has reached the last vestiges of its rule, the 
military elite within this system often begin the termination stage of their own government. This 
in turn has been used as leverage in order to establish exit guarantees, granting them a foothold 
in the new system so that they could resume their professional roles once the transformation was 
complete. 
In Iraq however, the transformation of power was accomplished with the express purpose 
of removing all members of the elite from authority. In discussing regime transition, Munck and 
Leff describe this type as “reform through rupture” in which transitions are dictated by the 
opposition with little or no control from the incumbent elite, who are too weak to control the 
process. The conclusion they derive is that this appears to “be the most unproblematic type of 
transition” as it facilitates a clear departure from the past. Furthermore, Authoritarian leaders 
who suffer defeat through these means often suffer through a similar fate, whether it be exile, 
imprisonment, execution. A further analysis is that of Share and Mainwaring, who describe 
dissolutions of regimes in which authoritarian elites have no influence over the transition in to 
more liberal regimes as collapse. The end result of such defeats results in the previous regime 
“being thoroughly discredited and delegitimized” (Stradiatto, 2004, p.7). The democratization 
process occurs with minimal or no input from the prior ruling elites and are often the least 
problematic, as highlighted by the successful transitions of Italy, Japan, and Germany. In 
analyzing the circumstances surrounding Iraq, these conditions were inherently apparent. The 
displacement of the ruling elite meant that they were no longer in the position to enter 
themselves as candidates within elections. The Ba’ath Party and Saddam Hussein had largely 
been eradicated, and in accordance with Munck and Leff’s theory on rupture, most of the high-
ranking military officers were in custody or executed. Those who remained loyal to regime were 
tracked, and while many possessed the capability to carry out sniper shootings and suicide 
bombings, their scare tactics were insignificant in exerting influence over the new government. 
Thus, the new regime was situated in a position in which its new government institution and 
founding documents could be free from the influence of its authoritarian predecessors. 
Thus, while the development of democracy cannot be explained by any one single factor 
fully, the deposition of the incumbent government apparatus removed the most significant 
impediment to its implementation. In this light, U.S intervention was a necessary condition to 
instigate regime change. Indeed, assistance from the United States is important during the 
transitional phase, “by establishing democratic institutions, aiding in constitution drafting, and 
establishing an effective government framework” (Stradiatto, 2004, p. 5). However, intervention 
alone is insufficient to guarantee consolidation. While military strength had been capable of 
removing one totalitarian regime, sustainable democracy was a complex process that required the 
interplay of several factors. 
         The promise of a democratic transformation was never accomplished within Iraq, and the 
country never became the bastion of liberal idealism that the U.S. had hoped to develop in the 
Middle East. While the climate of the country certainly played a role, the conflicting policy 
initiatives and bureaucratic infighting within U.S. agencies in the consolidation stage impeded 
the coordination of a stable democracy within Iraq. As competing and conflicting agendas 
clashed, development initiative and political decision-making failed to be sufficiently 
coordinating, resulting in the derailment of Bush’s neoconservative agenda. 
Post-War Planning 
  The Neo-Conservative approach draws its authority from its appeal to hard powers. It is 
born and thrives in the context of physical conflict, where the display of military prowess 
establishes the manner through which ultimate authority is derived. Indeed, the strength of 
American forces successfully overthrew the repressive regime of Saddam Hussein, and snuffed 
out the ruling elites which could have quickly supplanted him. However, once this impediment 
was removed the United States needed to address the manner in which a new government would 
be formed. On April 9th, 2002, the post-war planning began in the State Department’s Bureau of 
Near Eastern Affairs, and brought together high-ranking members of the CIA and State 
Department, as well as Iraqi exile’s from Europe and the United States with expertise in fields 
such as oil policy and transitional justice. At the onset of the grandly titled Future of Iraq project, 
it became apparent that negotiations between the State and Defense Departments would be 
subject to bureaucratic ranglings. The Defense Department war ardently against such an 
initiative, fearing that it “would lead to strengthening the hand of the State Department’s 
protégés in the struggle for supremacy inside the Iraqi opposition” (Taqi, 2015, p. 141). In turn, 
many in the State Department felt disrespected by what they viewed as a failure to seriously 
consider their planning efforts. As Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith 
highlights, despite the fact that there was an attempt at post-war planning for Iraq, “the teamwork 
did not develop… nor were the old divides transcended” (Feith 2008, pg. 277).  
 These interagency turf wars established a trend that would continue throughout the 
occupation of Iraq. Conflict regarding the manner of addressing certain concerns permeated the 
entirety of Bush’s administration, with disagreements between Vice President Dick Cheney and 
Secretary of State Colin Powell creating significant impediments to the development of a 
uniform policy. According to David Mitchell and Tansa George Massoud, the “coalition between 
Cheney and [Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfield was successful in using the bureaucracy to 
limit options considered and thereby influence the outcome, all of which was at Powell’s 
expense” (Mitchell and Massoud 2009: 276). Underlying these disputes however was the far 
more concerning reality that the entire process of planning for the post-war era was “mired in 
ineptitude, poor organization, and indifference” (Taqi, 2015, p. 144).  
 According to Professor George Joffe of Cambridge University, who was one of six 
experts chosen to advise Prime Minister Tony Blair regarding the invasion, those who were 
placed to guide Iraq had little experience in Middle Eastern Affairs. The individuals within 
leadership thus had no practical experience on the manner to approach transitioning to 
democracy. Indeed, the attitude surrounding those in power implied a certain arrogance and 
naivete in the ease of which democracy would sprout in the Middle East. According to Dr. Toby 
Dodge, "much of the rhetoric from Washington appeared to depict Saddam's regime as 
something separate from Iraqi society, all you had to do was remove him and the 60 bad men 
around him.” (Brands, 2012, p. 630). In fact, “little effort was made to understand the political 
realities of the region, or the depth of control that Saddam Hussein had had over the rivaling 
religious and ethnic groups” (Brigoux, 2014, p. 30). This lethal optimism, combined with the 
delayed onset of post-war planning, meant that reconstruction efforts by the United States were 
ineffective in addressing the structural problems within Iraqi society.  
 For example, on January 30th, 2005, the long-awaited vote to elect a national assembly 
and write a permanent constitution finally took place. It was lauded by the Bush administration 
as evidence that Iraq was making significant strides in order to implement democracy, and 
received considerable media attention throughout the west. Yet despite the high voter turnout, 
political leaders ordered “urban - slum underclass” Shi’ite and Sunni populations to boycott it in 
protest of American influence. As a result, there was a notable imbalance in representation in 
both the regional councils and parliament (Hill, 2011, p. 154). The dissatisfaction that developed 
due to this grew within the population, and contributed significantly to the civil war that occured 
between 2005 and 2007. Furthermore, the United States notably allowed up to two- million Iraqi 
born expatriates to vote, in the hopes that it would serve as an advantage to the U.S. appointed 
interim Prime Minister Allawi chances of reelection. These efforts proved ineffective and 
Allawi’s party came in third place, but it highlights the United States inability to conform to Iraqi 
self-determination. 
 Several fundamental problems needed to be addressed by the time a new government 
took place for a stable Iraq. Basic services needed to be restored, infrastructure needed to be 
rebuilt, and jobs needed to be established. Violence between varying religious, ethnic, and 
regional groups needed to be suppressed, and they needed a unifying force to ensure future 
efforts would be prevented. Most importantly, the political culture of violence needed to be 
altered. However, the American over-reliance on Neo Political ideology obstructed policymakers 
from developing a successful method of effecting these changes. For one, the fixation on the 
perception of America as the bulwark of idealized democracy meant that those in power were 
unwilling to develop a version of democracy that was cohesive with Iraq’s socio-political 
culture. Thus the implementation of a democractice system did not serve as a cohesive system as 
Americans anticipated. Instead it was viewed by some political factions in the region as an 
invasive and subversive force, an extension of the Western imperialism that had damaged their 
country significantly already.  
Furthermore, because of the Neopolitical definition of power, the United States acted 
under the perception that their authority would serve as a coercive force in enacting conformity 
among the population. Indeed, it was this power that had led to the acceptance of democracy in 
Japan and Germany. However, those in charge of democratization efforts underestimated the 
hold that ethnic divides would have over the country, as well as the strength of anti-American 
sentiment throughout the region. They had naively believed that the people of Iraq would 
welcome the overthrow of Saddam’s repressive regime, and the “freedom” that democracy 
seemingly entailed. 
Turkey 
Of the six candidate countries for EU succession, none has had as long an association 
with the body as Turkey. Its involvement with European integration dates as far back as the 
1950s, during a period in which the country sought to enhance cooperation with the EEC. 
Indeed, “Turkey considers itself as a part of Europe, and shares with it common principles and 
values, and thus its relations with the EU are a strategic aspect of its foreign policy” (Republic of 
Turkey, 2013). As a result of this keen interest, it is considered an essential partner on such 
issues as security, migration, the economy, and counter-terrorism. The country has even 
established itself as a member in certain European institutions, notably the Council of Europe 
(African, 2006, p.56). In 1987, Turkey applied to become a member of the EU, but the 
application was rejected due to its consistent violations in areas such as human rights and 
democracy. Tensions were heightened when in 1997 Turkey was once again not included in 
accession negotiations due to its inability to satisfactorily meet the Copenhagen criteria. This was 
necessary to begin accession talks, and required that potential states must have,  
“Stability  of  institutions  guaranteeing  democracy, the  rule  of  law,  human  
rights  and  respect  for  and protection   of   minorities,   the   existence   of   a 
functioning   market   economy   as   well   as   the capacity  to  cope  with  competitive  
pressure  and market   forces   within   the   Union.” 
 It was not until two years after their initial bid that the EU agreed to consider Turkey a 
candidate country. The Helsinki Decision of 1999 marked an advancement of Turkish-EU 
relations, and “a political avalanche of democratization” (Kubicek, 2011, p. 914). It allowed for 
Turkey’s eligibility for the EU, outlining that the process would be initiated once the 
Copenhagen criteria were met. By November 2000, the EU issued the Accession Partnership 
Document (APD), which outlined measures necessary for implementation in the “short term,” 
and the “medium term” (Hale, 2003; p. 108). In response to these orders, the Turkish parliament 
passed significant constitutional and legal reforms between 2001-2005, in an era which would be 
described as the “golden period of Turkey’s reforming process” (Hale, 2011, p. 107). In 
particular, reform was centered on four major points of contention “ first, freedom of expression 
and association and of political parties; second, the treatment of ethnic minorities (particularly as 
regards cultural rights); third, the abolition of the death penalty; and, fourth, the reduction of the 
political role of the military” (Hale, 2003, p. 107). Though addressing these issues did not 
resolve all the concerns the EU had, they were the most pressing stipulations required to begin 
accession talks.  
Fundamental Freedoms 
 Turkey claims to be a democracy, yet many of the fundamental freedoms associated with 
such a system are lacking. While the original text of the Constitution did outline the right to 
“freedom of residence and movement,” “freedom of thought and opinion,” “freedom of 
communication,” and “the right to disseminate.. thoughts and opinions,” it also included several 
provisions which severely impeded the application of these rights. Both Articles 13 and 14 
placed constraints on speech which deviated from the national interests of the country. For 
example, Article 13 stated that:  
“Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted by law, in conformity with the letter 
and spirit of the Constitution, with the aim of safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the 
State with its territory and nation, national sovereignty, the Republic, [and] national 
security…” (Turkish Constitution, 2011).  
These and further statutes were utilized for years in order inhibit dissent, particularly in relation 
to Islamist or Kurdish issues. Penal Code Article 312 for example was utilized to “prosecute such 
people on the grounds that calling for greater political or cultural rights for the Kurds, or 
adherence to Islamic principles in politics, constitute an incitement to racial or religious hatred.” 
(Hale, 2003; pg. 112). The Anti-Terror Law of 1991 made offenses such as public assemblies 
and propaganda opposing the current regime punishable by up to 2 to 5 years of imprisonment. 
These legal provisions were deemed contrary to human rights, and thus the ADP established a 
“short-term” measure whereby Turkey would need to “strengthen legal and constitutional 
guarantees for the right to freedom of expression in line with article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights [and to] address in that context the situation of those persons in 
prison sentenced for expressing non-violent opinions” (Council of EU, 2003). 
As a result of these guidelines, by October 2001 the Turkish government enacted a 
package of constitutional amendments.  Both Article 13 and 14 were altered “to bring them in 
rough correspondence with Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on human rights” 
(115). Thus Article 14 was amended to include,  
“No provision of this Constitution shall be interpreted in a manner that enables the State 
or individuals to destroy the fundamental rights and freedoms embodied in the 
Constitution or to stage an activity with the aim of restricting them more extensively than 
stated in the Constitution” (Turkish Constitution, 2011).  
 Further  
In 2002, three more packages were adopted. The most extensive was enacted on the 2nd 
of August, and “abolished the death penalty in peacetime, revised the Anti-Terror Law, allowed 
for broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, and opened the road for the retrial of all the 
cases that the European Court of Human Rights found to be in violation of the European 
Convention of Human Rights” (Müftüler Baç, 2005, p. 23). This allowed for greater ease of 
freedom of expression, association, and broadcasting and the press (European Commission, 
2003, . 72). It was a significant stride in fulfilling the goals outlined in the Copenhagen 
Agreement, and its transformative nature was indicative of the urgency with which government 
officials were seeking to reform the country. During this period, the accession talks for the 
Central and Eastern Europe countries were about to be concluded, and unless Turkey could show 
that they had sufficiently adopted measures that fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria, the country 
would be left out of the Enlargement process. Furthermore, the regime responsible for enacting 
these resolutions was the same one that had borne witness to the Helsinki summit, and thus the 
members were concerned about the ramifications of failing to meet such goals.  
 By 2003, a Regular Report from the European Commission found that “over the past year 
the Turkish government has shown great determination in accelerating the pace of reforms… 
[and] has taken important steps to ensure their effective implementation” (2004, p. 11). In 
November 2002, the Justice and Development Party won the general election and the political 
consolidation that came from this led to significant institutional convergence towards European 
standards. The notion of “incitement” was addressed, and by 2003 the penalty for criticising 
government institutions was removed. Imprisoning individuals based on opinions that were non-
violent was abolished in 2004, and in the same year the Grand National Assembly passed a law 
on freedom of association which was considered the most liberal one in 20 years. No longer were 
groups required to inform or request permission from government officials to gather, and 
security forces could no longer appear on the premises without a warrant. By 2007 it was found 
that “the legal framework for freedom of assembly [was] broadly in line with European 
standards” (Turkey Progress Report, 2007; pg. 16). Though legal provisions which inhibit the 
freedoms of the citizens of the country still persist, the implementation of these amendments 
reveals that the influence of the EU led to reforms.  
Treatment of Minorities 
The establishment of protections for minority groups remains a concern within Turkey. 
Articles 37-45 of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 establishes the right of minorities to “use their 
own language, the right of political and civic equality, the right to establish religious, educational 
and social welfare institutions, and the right to freedom of religion, travel, and migration” (700). 
Contention arises, as this establishes rights and liberties for such groups, and thus fulfills the 
minority related criteria for EU membership. As a result, while Turkey has willingly passed 
numerous treaties and amendments on improving human rights, the government does not find it 
necessary to sign the EU’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. 
However, only non-Muslim communities (Armernians, Greeks, and Jews) are recognized as 
minorities, and therefore other ethnic groups are not granted protected status. As a result 
communities such as the Alewites, Assyrians, and Kurds are subject to political discrimination. 
Moreover, efforts taken to reform Kurdish issues have been viewed as a threat to Turkey’s 
national security (Hale, 2003).  
 Concerns regarding progress in this area were always addressed in European Commission 
reports, but beginning in 2003 assessments on minority listings became more expansive and 
diversified. This can “be interpreted as an increasing effort on the EU’s part to encourage Turkey 
to reconsider its minority regime” (Oran, 2021, p. 707). In response to consistent urgings, in 
2001 Turkey produced the National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis. This document 
reaffirms the short and medium term goals outlined by the Accession Partnership, but abstains 
from addressing minority rights as a separate issue. Pursuant to this document, Turkey 
established three fields of transformation that could be undertaken without modifying the 
traditional minority framework: “eliminating discrimation, improving cultural rights, and 
improving religious freedom” (Oran, 2021, p. 712).  
 Reform was thus accomplished in pursuit of these goals. In order to eliminate 
discrimination, the Labor Code was amended in 2003 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
religion, race, color, sect, or language. The criminal code adopted in 2004 also included similar 
provisions in regards to access to services and education. Efforts were made to remove prejudice 
regarding minorities from school textbooks by the Ministry of Education, and religious textbooks 
were amended to include concerns related to Christianity. Consideration for improving cultural 
rights was included within Turkey’s Accession Partnership Document mainly to address the 
issues related to the Kurdish population. It prioritized enhancing the linguistic rights of this 
group, and by 2001 the ban on publishing in a non-Turkish language was removed from the 
Constitution. Thus the 2002 Constitutional amendments included legalizing the use of minority 
languages and dialects in radio and television broadcasting. Significantly, special courses were 
introduced to teach Kurdish.  
However, despite this progress, there still remains problems which are necessary to 
address to remedy EU concerns. In spite of these new regulations, “there is still a gap between de 
facto and de jure minority issues,” in exercising these freedoms (Oran, 2021, p. 713). For 
example, Kurdish radio channels do exist, but they are often subject to heavy bureaucratic 
complications. The duration of broadcasts are strictly limited, occurring no more than forty-five 
minutes a day, and no more than four days a week. Furthermore, the government has yet to 
designate Kurds as a minority group, nor does it appear that it has the intention to do so in the 
coming years. This treatment is symptomatic of Kamalist nationalism which prevails throughout 
the country. Through this lens, expanding cultural rights too greatly could lead to these 
communities garnering sufficient autonomy to separate from Turkey. Thus despite the desire to 
appease the EU, Turkey maintains a restrictive approach to this issue.  
 One of the most important issues regarding Turkey’s membership negotiation is that of 
religious freedom. The constitutional amendments enacted in 2002 have led to some 
improvement in this sphere, notably that non-Muslim foundations were allowed to acquire and 
register property. This meant that new places of worship could be established. Furthermore, 
religious courses were expanded to include teachings about faiths other than Islam. However, 
secularism is enshrined within the constitution, and concern remains within the country that 
improving religious freedom could lead to the growth of fundamentalism (Prodromou, 2010). 
Thus despite the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, religious communities still face persistent 
structural obstacles. For example, in 2004 the Turkish National Security Council suspended the 
opening of the Halki School of Theology over concerns that the Greek Orthodox minority 
“constituted a potential security threat to the territorial integrity of the Turkish state” 
(Prodromou, 2010; p. 19).  
 Thus while Turkey has been amenable to adapting to EU demands, it has consistently 
shown resistance in altering its traditional approach to minority groups. The selective adaptation 
of EU policy in the form of the Turkish National Program has been inadequate in moving the 
country towards “full compliance with modern international standards and treatments of 
minorities” (Turkey Progress Report, 2004; pg. 48).  
The Abolition of the Death Penalty 
 The abolition of the death penalty is not only an explicit stipulation of the EU, but is also 
used internationally as an indicator of development by the United Nations. As William Schabas 
asserts, it is “generally considered to be an important element in democratic development for 
States breaking with a past characterized by… injustice” (2002; p. 10). The EU had consistently 
called for Turkey to align itself with this policy, which was mandated by Protocol No.6 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR). The constitutional 
amendment of 2001 restricted the use of the death penalty to crimes “committed in cases of war, 
or the imminent threat of war and terror crimes,” or in certain cases of “felonies against the state” 
(Ozbudun, 2007, p. 189). This meant that the death penalty was restricted in times of peace. In 
August 2002, the third reform package was passed and the terror crime exception was 
eliminated. Finally, by 2003 the Parliament voted to abolish the death penalty fully, which was 
then formalized by the 2004 constitutional amendment (Turkish Report, 2004). 
 As a result of these reforms, Turkey has achieved the standards established by the EU in 
regards to the death penalty and signed the ECHR. According to Ian Manners, the “EU has 
played an important external role in bringing pressure to bear on [this] country” (2002, p. 50). 
Thus it can be asserted that the EU has been effective in instituting sufficient reform in this 
sphere.  
The Military Influence on Political Life 
 One major obstacle to EU accession was the issue of the military influence on Turkish 
political life. Criticisms have primarily focused on the lack of accountability to either civilian or 
parliamentary oversight. During the last century, the military has consolidated greater authority 
through four military coups: 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 . In addition to this, the legitimacy of 
its autonomy was further reinforced by the fact that it is seen as a protector of Kamalist 
nationalism and Turkish Identity. This role would need to be diminished if Turkey were to be 
accepted as a member of the EU.  
 The European Commission had consistently criticized the National Security Council 
(NSC) in its yearly reports as an undemocratic mechanism 445. Chaired by the President, the 
council’s agenda relates to any matter that may be perceived as a threat to national security. Thus 
while the Constitution delineates it as a consultative organ, its decisions have often been given 
priority by the Councils of Ministers. Despite the critique levied against it by the EU, the NSC 
was a vocal advocate of European integration since the 1990s. This was because it was in 
accordance with Kemalist ideology, which praised modernization and Westernization. According 
to former Chief of the General Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoˇglu, “the armed forces do not even discuss 
the issue of whether Turkey should enter the EU or not… the membership of the EU will assure 
so many benefits for Turkey” (Güney and Karatekelioğlu, 2005, p. 455). The NSC however has 
been adamant that two “untouchable republican principles” remain strictly within its purview: 
that of secularism and unity. Thus it has intervened on reform related to the Kurdish issue and 
cultural rights, both of which are EU priorities.  
 Despite its adamant commitment to maintain certain principles, the military has been 
willing to acquiesce on modifying “its strategies and policies to interact more with civilians, to 
be as transparent as possible, and to not impede democratic consolidation” (452). Beginning in 
2001, a number of reforms were passed in pursuit of this. Article 118 was amended to increase 
the number of civilian representatives of the NSC from five to nine, while sustaining the number 
of military members at five. It further underscored that the role of the body would be advisory, 
and that its judgement would no longer be given priority consideration. The seventh reform 
package introduced in 2003 amended the Law on the National Security Council, which 
fundamentally changed the composition and the duties of the NSC. Notably, “the transparency of 
defense expenditures was enhanced,” “the post of Security General [was] no longer reserved for 
military personnel,” and “unlimited access… to any civilian agency [was] aborgated” (Güney 
and Karatekelioğlu, 2005456).  
 Another concern was the competence of military courts to try civilians, which were 
continuously utilized to limit freedom of expression. Consequently pressure from the EU led to 
the introduction of training courses to increase the competency of military judges in 2003. By 
2006, the “eight harmonization package enforced the removal of Article 11 of the law on the 
Establishment and Trial Procedures of Military Courts to prosecute civilians” (Mohammed, 
2015, p.55). The military has shown marked willingness to amend the scope of its power in order 
to “turn to the west. Accordingly, in 2010 a report by the European Commission found that these 
reforms had been efficient in aligning Turkey with EU standards in this sphere.  
Conclusion 
 As seen from the preceding analysis, since the 1999 Helsinki Conference Turkey has 
consistently implemented new laws and passed various reform packages in the pursuit of 
meeting the goals outlined by the APD. In the pursuit of democratic stabilization, the EU has 
utilized the Copenhagen Criteria, the conditionality principle, and its enlargement policy in order 
to exert pressure on the country. Notably, since the areas that the EU has regularly identified as 
major political concerns have coincided with the priority reforms Turkey has implemented, it can 
be logically concluded that the EU has served as a motivating influence on these efforts. 
Significant progress has been made as a result of these efforts, specifically in  expanding 
fundamental freedoms,  abolishing the death penalty, restricting military influence, and 












In the years following the Cold War, both the United States and the European Union 
developed unique conceptualizations of their roles as democracy promoters. The United States 
viewed itself as a unilateral authority, fueled by a Neoconservatism idealism which underscored 
its presence in Iraq. However, its reliance on this school of thought had an adverse effect on its 
efforts. It failed to institute the necessary reforms to remedy the institutional failings of the 
country, and was unwilling to amend its behavior to appeal to the socio-political culture of the 
country. Its reliance on hard powers further alienated it from acceptance from the Iraqi populace, 
who instead saw their influence as invasive.  
In comparison, the European Union’s approach to reform was significantly more 
successful within Turkey, where its presence served as a catalyst for a series of constitutional 
amendments. Through the utilization of norm diffusion, EU standards were willingly adopted in 
a desire to gain greater access to the benefits of membership to the body promised. Thus in 
pursuit of cohesion, the European Union’s approach was more advantageous. Despite this 
progress, Turkey has still failed to garner full acceptance into the European Union. In recent 
years it has failed to successfully meet the standards outlined by Copenhagen agreement, and its 
accession is on an indefinite hold. The ability to successfully implement a fully democratic 
system in this country can be found in the EU’s inconsistency in its approach to its normative 
policy. Nevertheless, the EU’s strategic and economic interests have also constituted vital 
triggers for the EU’s enlargement policy. Furthermore, the EU containment policy towards 
Turkey has lessened the effectiveness and credibility of its  normative approach in influencing 
political developments in Turkey, and the EU could have  exerted  more pressure  and  used  
more  effective measures in order to produce a better outcome  with respect to the Turkish 
reform process.  
 Through the analysis of these cases, it can be asserted that democratic promotion can be a 
successful instrument in the promotion of peace. However, the theoretical approach taken by the 
transformative power plays a significant role in whether such a system will be accepted. Reform 
will be most effective if it is adopted willingly by the institutional authorities of a transitional 
country. The NPE model is most conducive to this, though in order for its potential to be fully 
realized the EU must commit to a uniform approach in all applicant countries. Furthermore, 
progress in this realm will not be an immediate effect of implementing new policies. Rebuilding 
countries which have often been victims of oppressive regimes and inadequate modernization 
will not be easily accomplished. However, the benefit that such transformations could have on a 
global level is worthy of pursuing.  
 Several factors impeded the progress of the development of a fully comprehensive 
analysis. One was the different socio-political factors that existed within each country. In 
comparison to Iraq, Turkey’s constitution had already gone through a process of democratization 
within the 1920s. It therefore was adaptable to reform by the European Union. Further, the ties 
between Turkey and the European Union were significantly stronger than the ties between Iraq 
and the United States. As discussed, Turkey was a willing recipient of the European Union’s 
influence, thus acquiesced to adopting measures of democracy to a degree that Iraq did not. In 
order to move forward, more analysis will need to be dedicated to other instances of 
democratization efforts by both powers. Increasing the number of case studies in further research 
will create the opportunity to determine factors which assist in democracy promotion, and factors 
that inhibit it. Another concern is the time period. The rise of democratization has been a recent 
development, and as such the period in order to study its effects has been narrow. Thus, 
consistent attention will need to be devoted to how these transitional countries develop in the 
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